Abstract-We consider the MIMO wiretap channel, that is a MIMO broadcast channel where the transmitter sends some confidential information to one user which is a legitimate receiver, while the other user is an eavesdropper. Perfect secrecy is achieved when the transmitter and the legitimate receiver can communicate at some positive rate, while insuring that the eavesdropper gets zero bits of information. In this paper, we compute the perfect secrecy capacity of the multiple antenna MIMO broadcast channel, where the number of antennas is arbitrary for both the transmitter and the two receivers. Our technique involves a careful study of a Sato-like upper bound via the solution of a certain algebraic Riccati equation.
and , the output of their channel. The knowledge that the eavesdropper gets of from its received signal is modeled by (1) since the mutual information measures the amount of information that contains about . The notion of perfect secrecy captures the idea that whatever are the resources available to the eavesdropper, they will not allow him to get a single bit of information. Perfect secrecy thus requires (2) to hold asymptotically as grows. In other words, the amount of randomness is the same in or in . The decoder computes an estimate of the transmitted message , and the probability of decoding erroneously is given by
The amount of ignorance that the eavesdropper has about a message is called the equivocation rate, and following the above discussion, it is naturally defined as:
Definition 1:
The equivocation rate at the eavesdropper is (4) with . Clearly, if is equal to the information rate , then , which yields perfect secrecy. Associated with secrecy is a perfect secrecy rate , which is the amount of information that can be sent not only reliably but also confidentially, with the help of a code.
Definition 2:
A perfect secrecy rate is said to be achievable if for any , there exists a sequence of codes such that for any , we have
The first condition (5) is the standard definition of achievable rate as far as reliability is concerned. The second condition (6) guarantees secrecy, up to the equivocation rate, which we will require to be to have perfect secrecy. The secrecy capacity is defined similarly to the standard capacity:
The secrecy capacity is the maximum achievable perfect secrecy rate.
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B. Previous Work
In his seminal work [27] , Wyner showed for discrete memoryless channels that the perfect secrecy capacity is actually the difference of the respective mutual informations of the two users, maximized over the input distribution. To prove this result, he worked under the assumption that the channel of the eavesdropper is a degraded version of the channel of the legitimate receiver. This result has been generalized to Gaussian channels by Leung et al. [12] , under the same assumption.
The wire-tap channel has been adopted as a model for numerous works on information theoretic security, and in particular for those on fading channels, both for point-to-point and multi-user systems. We mainly review the prior work for the point-to-point case. In [6] , Gopala et al. have shown that the secrecy capacity is also the difference of the two mutual informations maximized over the input distribution in the case of a single antenna fading channel, under the assumption of asymptotically long coherence intervals, when the transmitter either knows both channels or only the legitimate channel. When only the legitimate channel is known, an optimal power allocation is given, using a variable rate transmission scheme. In [1] , Barros et al. have characterized information theoretic security in terms of outage probability. In the case when the transmitter does not know the eavesdropper channel, they define and compute the probability of transmitting at a secrecy rate bigger than the secrecy capacity (i.e., the outage probability) as the probability that the information theoretic security is compromised. They also show that the probability that the secrecy capacity is positive can actually be greater than zero even if the average SNR of the legitimate channel is weaker than the one of the eavesdropper. They extend their work in [2] , where they also consider the cases when Alice has either imperfect or perfect knowledge of the eavesdropper channel. Independently, Liang et al. [15] and Li et al. [13] have computed the secrecy capacity for the parallel wiretap channel with independent subchannels, and derived optimal source power allocation. The secrecy capacity of the wiretap channel with single antenna fading channel follows. Finally, the results of [15] are extended in [16] , where a fading broadcast channel with confidential messages is considered, with common information for two receivers, and confidential information intended for only one receiver. The secrecy capacity is computed for the parallel broadcast channel with both independent and degraded subchannels.
In this work, we are interested in the perfect secrecy capacity of multiple antenna channels. A first study of the problem has been proposed by Hero [7] . In a different context than the wire-tap channel, he introduced the so-called constraints of low probability of detection, and low probability of intercept, considering the scenario where the transmitter and the receiver are both informed about their channel while the eavesdropper is uniformed about his. In [23] , the SIMO wiretap channel has been considered. Several results on the secrecy in MIMO communication have been provided recently. In [14] , lower bounds on the secrecy capacity is computed for the MISO case. Furthermore, a lower bound is computed in the MIMO case. This lower bound, which proves an achievability result for the secrecy capacity, is shown to be the expected result, namely, the difference of the two user mutual informations maximized over the input distribution, like in the previous cases. The secrecy capacity for the MISO case has also been proven independently by Khisti et al. [8] and Shafiee et al. [24] . In [8] , the authors furthermore give an upper bound for the MIMO case, in a regime asymptotic in SNR. The secrecy capacity has been computing for the particular cases where both the transmitter and receiver have two antennas, and the eavesdropper has either one antenna [25] or two antennas [21] . Finally, Liu et al. [17] , [18] computed the secrecy capacity for a Gaussian broadcast channel, where a multi-antenna transmitter sends independent confidential messages to two users.
The contribution of this paper is to compute the perfect secrecy capacity of the multiple antenna wire-tap channel, for any number of transmit/receive antennas, as well as for any SNR regime. One of the difficulties in studying the MIMO wire-tap channel is that the broadcast MIMO channel is not degraded, an assumption which is crucial in the proof of the converse in the original paper by Wyner (as well as in the proofs presented in [12] , [6] , [1] , [15] ). In order to compute the secrecy capacity, we provide a proof technique for the converse, which is different from the original one, and allows us to deal with channels that are not degraded. Note that our result shows that the inner bound by Li et al. [14] is tight, and this is proved by the computation of an upper bound that actually matches the lower bound. Independently of our results, Khisthi and Wornell [9] - [11] have also computed the secrecy capacity of the MIMO wiretap channel (which they refer to as MIMO-ME). They use alternative means, namely they exploit Czisár and Körner's result [4] and identify the necessary auxiliary random variables. Furthermore, their characterization is through a saddlepoint (essentially, the optimization in Proposition 5 below), whereas our characterization is through a single optimization (see Theorem 1 below). An alternative derivation of our result, and that of Khisti-Wornell, has also appeared in Liu and Shamai [19] . Finally, a characterization of the secrecy capacity using a MMSE approach has appeared in [3] .
C. MIMO Wiretap Channel
We consider the MIMO wiretap channel (see Fig. 1 ), that is, a broadcast channel where the transmitter is equipped with transmit antennas, while the legitimate receiver and an eavesdropper have respectively and receive antennas. Thus, our model is described by the following broadcast channel: (7) (8) where and are respectively and vectors. The notation that we will use throughout the paper is that the subscript refers to the main channel (the one of the legitimate receiver), while the subscript refers to the eavesdropper channel. We will denote by the identity matrix, and by the all zero matrix. We may omit the subscript if the dimension is obvious. We make the following assumptions:
• is the complex transmitted signal, with satisfying the power constraint (9) This power constraint holds for the whole paper, and we may sometimes omit it. Note though that the optimizations that follow will instead use as power constraint instead of (9), since we can fix the power to , solve the optimization for , and then pick the optimal which is .
• and are respectively and fixed channel matrices. They are both assumed to be known at the transmitter and receiver. Along the paper we will usually consider two cases: the definite case, that is when or , which corresponds to the degraded case, and the indefinite case, which is when some of the eigenvalues of are positive, and other negative or zero. We discard the meaningless case where .
• are independent circularly symmetric complex Gaussian vectors with identity covariance and independent of the transmitted signal .
Theorem 1:
The secrecy capacity of the MIMO wiretap channel is given by (10) The paper contains the proof of the above theorem: in Section II, we prove an achievability result which characterizes the optimal matrices , while Section 3 contains the main results, namely the proof of the converse.
Since our proof uses mainly optimization techniques, we may use some well known optimization facts without explicit references. The reader may refer to [20] when no explicit other reference is given.
II. ON THE ACHIEVABILITY
In this section, we state the achievability part of the secrecy capacity, and further prove that in the nondegraded case, the achievability is maximized by matrices which are low rank, that is of any rank .
Proposition 1:
The perfect secrecy rate (11) is achievable. This has already been proved [14] . 1 In fact, the interpretation is obvious. When is chosen, the difference between the resulting mutual informations to the legitimate user and eavesdropper can be secretly transmitted.
Proposition 2:
Let be an optimal solution to the optimization problem (12) 1) If is either indefinite or semidefinite, then is a low rank matrix. 2) Let be the rank of . If , then for at least one optimal solution we have that . Proof: 1) In order to show that the optimal is low rank, we define a Lagrangian which includes the power constraint, but not the non-negativity constraint , and show that this yields no solution. From there, we can conclude that the optimal solution is on the boundary of the cone of positive semi-definite matrices, namely matrices of rank . We thus define the following Lagrangian: (13) and look for its stationary points, that is for the solution of the following equation: (14) By premultiplying the above equation by and postmultiplying it by , we get
If , then which is discarded by our model assumption. Thus, equivalently, by further pre and postmultiplying by , we can rewrite
Now if we assume that , then all the eigenvalues of (17) are strictly positive (see Lemma 1 below) . This implies that the above equation can have a solution if and only if the Hermitian matrix (18) 1 As pointed out by a reviewer, this proposition also follows from either Wyner's achievability result or Csiszár-Körner's capacity formula by an appropriate selection of the underlying random variables.
is positive definite. This means that either and , or and . This gives a contradiction if is either indefinite or semidefinite, implying that has to be low rank. 2) Let us now assume that (we make no assumption on whether the channel is degraded). Let be the rank of , so that we can decompose as for some matrix
. We now define a Lagrangian similarly as above, namely (19) Note that , since the maximization over of the considered objective function subject to the constraint that is equivalent to (20) We now compute the derivative of the Lagrangian, which yields
The rank of the matrix on the left is smaller or equal to . When , the matrix on the right hand side has rank (because the second matrix is strictly positive definite: it is the sum of the identity matrix and a matrix which is itself strictly positive definite) which means that (24) which yields as desired. When , the derivative of the Lagrangian simplifies to (25) or equivalently (26) which yields (27) This clearly implies that the objective function is zero, since the quantities inside the two logs become identical. But also makes the objective function zero, so we might as well take , for which as desired.
Note that this result is intuitively clear, since the transmitter should not use the directions in which the eavesdropper is stronger, which explains why the optimal matrix is low rank. The proof is done in three main steps, that we briefly sketch before entering into the details.
Step 1. We have, similarly to [12] , [6] that (30) Thus, all the work consists of maximizing . In Subsection 3.1, we start by proving the following upper bound: and strict inequality is required for the inverse to exist. At this point of the proof, the converse can be proved for the two "simple" cases when and , which are the cases when the channel is degraded.
Step 2. In practice, and are independent. However, the secrecy capacity does not depend on : the legitimate receiver and eavesdropper have no way of exploiting any possible correlation, since they decode based on their separate received signals. This is an argument classically used for broadcast channels. Thus, we can assume that is a function of both and for the purposes of tightening our upper bound. Since (34) for all such that , we have that
By proving (in Subsection 3.2) that is actually concave in and convex in , we are then allowed to write that (36)
We can now jointly optimize over and , and compute the optimal in closed form expression, while showing that the optimal is on the boundary of its domain, namely, is low rank.
Step 3. We conclude the proof (Subsection 3.3) by showing that the converse matches the achievability, using the closed form expression for the optimal .
A. Bound on and Result for the Degraded Case
We start by recalling a standard result, which has already been proved in [12] , [6] .
Lemma 2:
Given any sequence of codes with and for any , , the secrecy rate can be upper bounded as follows:
for . We thus focus now on finding an upper bound on . We provide two approaches:
1) An upper bound is given by assuming that the legitimate receiver knows both his channel and the one of the eavesdropper.
2) The same upper bound can also be obtained as follows.
Clearly, is upper bounded by taking the supremum over all input distributions (38) where denotes the value of when is optimal. We will prove that the optimal distribution is Gaussian. The cases described in the above proposition can be understood as a simple generalization of the scalar case, since those are the degraded cases. When , the legitimate receiver has a stronger channel in every possible spatial direction, and the capacity is given by the difference of the respective mutual informations of the two users maximized over the input distribution, while if , then this is true for the eavesdropper, and thus, no positive secrecy capacity can be achieved.
We are now left with the case when is indefinite, which is the nondegraded case, and thus the interesting case to understand.
B. Minimization Over and Maximization Over
We have shown in Proposition 3 that (68)
Since this is true for all such that , we further have that (69) To understand this double optimization, we start by analyzing the function . 
To check the concavity in , we are thus left to check that (79) which is true by (76).
3) Since we have shown above that is concave in and convex in , we have a saddle point and, therefore, [20] (80) By combining the above result with (69), we can exchange the order of the two optimizations, to get We now develop using (84) to get
This yields the following nonsymmetric algebraic Ricatti equation in
We now notice that can be alternatively written as (90) where is a constant that disappears in the gradient computation. This yields a gradient expression for , where the roles are exchanged as follows:
. In turn, we get for the algebraic Ricatti equation (91) with which we will continue the computations.
One way of solving an algebraic Riccati [5] of the form (92) is to look for invariant subspaces of (93) Here we have that is given by
Invariant subspaces of (and consequently explicit solutions to the Ricatti equation) are computed in the following proposition. 
is an invariant subspace of . Let be the eigenspace associated to . Thus, a more precise Jordan basis for (as defined in (94)) is given by (137) From this Jordan basis of , we have that (138) is a solution of the Ricatti equation, where is any matrix, and is any matrix, .
C. The Converse Matches the Achievability
So far, we have solved the optimization problem
by computing the optimal in a closed form expression, and by showing that the optimal is low rank. We are now ready (132) to conclude the proof, by proving that the optimal makes the converse match the achievability. by definition of and . To conclude the proof, notice that when is indefinite, there exist and such that the above matrix is positive definite.
IV. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we considered the problem of computing the perfect secrecy capacity of a multiple antenna channel, based on a generalization of the wire-tap channel to a MIMO broadcast wire-tap channel. We proved that for an arbitrary number of transmit/receive antennas, the perfect secrecy capacity is the difference of the two mutual informations, the one of the legitimate user minus the one of the eavesdropper, after a suitable optimization over the transmitters input covariance matrix.
A main assumption in our work is that the transmitter knows the channels to both the legitimate user and the eavesdropper. While this may be a plausible assumption in some scenarios, a more realistic assumption is that the transmitter knows only the statistics of the eavesdropper. An important open problem is to determine the secrecy capacity in this case. Finally, it would also be useful to come up with practical schemes that can guarantee perfect secrecy when the transmitter has only partial CSI of the legitimate user.
